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Sternberg (1977a, 1977b) has proposed a componential theory of information processing on 
analogies. The current study attempts convergent validation of the basic findings in verbal 
analogies by a method that is based on different underlying assumptions. Although the data 
were generally consistent with Sternberg's theory, the data indicated that application is 
better described by two separate events. Furthermore, the extent of individual differences in 
strategy models was so substantial that a higher level processing operation, such as control 
strategies, should be postulated, rather than to support a single-strategy model as characterizing 
analogy solving. 
w 
Verbal analogies, such as the following, 
Race :Man :: Strain:? 
(1) Science (2) Bacteria (3) Fatigue (4) Tension (Answer: Bacteria) 
have increasingly become a target for cognitive research. 
Contemporary experimental research on verbal analogies 
has been primarily motivated by the presumed 
importance of analogical reasoning in intelligent 
behavior. That is, analogical reasoning is thought to be 
involved whenever an individual draws a parallel between 
different things in his experience. Research on verbal 
analogies is important, since it seeks to explain 
frequently occurring processes in thinking. Reitman's 
(1965) computer simulation of verbal analogy solving 
and Rumelhart and Abrahamson's (1973) semantic 
distance theory of analogical reasoning represent some 
major examples of the analogy research that has been 
generated from contemporary experimental research 
on cognition. 
More recently, however, experimental research 
on verbal analogies has been guided by an added 
perspective: the need to explain individual differences 
in analogy solving. Verbal analogies have had a major 
role in the measurement of general intelligence, since 
they are the most heavily loading item on the general 
factor (i.e., Spearman's, 1927, "g") that is common 
among intelligence test items. Unfortunately, however, 
the nature of intelligence is not well understood 
because individual differences research has concerned 
trait organization rather than theoretical processes. 
Explaining performance on verbal analogies from 
individual differences in the underlying component 
events could potentially provide a more adequate 
foundation for a theory of intelligence. 
This study was partially supported by General Research 
Fund 3472-X0-0038 to Susan E. Whitely, Principal Investigator, 
from the University of Kansas. 
Recently, Sternberg (1977a, 1977b) has proposed a 
theory of analogical reasoning that not only is more 
general than previous work (Reitman, 1965; Rumelhart 
& Abrahamson, 1973), but also explicitly considers 
individual differences. Sternberg's componential theory 
of analogical reasoning postulates six processing events: 
encoding, inference, mapping, application, justification, 
and preparation and response. Four alternative models 
are presented in which the processes are organized into 
strategies for solving the analogy. In all models, the 
processes are ordered into the same general sequence, 
but the way in which the processing events are executed 
(self-terminating vs. exhaustive mode) varies in models. 
Additionally, for the forced-choice analogies, such as 
ability test items, Sternberg presents two different 
strategies for scanning the alternatives. These strategies 
can be applied to any of the models, thus yielding eight 
models for forced-choice analogies. 
Sternberg (1977a, 1977b) presents empirical evidence 
on the various processing models at both the group and 
individual subject levels. His major dependent variable is 
response time, which he attempts to reproduce from 
alternative mathematical models for the processing 
strategies. The parameters for the six processes in the 
mathematical models are estimated by regression, in 
conjunction with a priming method for presenting the 
analogy and measures of information differences 
between the analogy terms. Using a subtractive factor 
logic, it is assumed that the number of processing events 
occurring during the presentation of the full analogy 
problem can be controlled by varying the prime 
condition: Thus, processing durations for several events 
that occur in a specific sequence can be estimated 
separately. The prime is systematically varied so that 
some events occur prior to the presentation of the full 
problem. Several types of analogies—figural, verbal, and 
geometric—are modeled. 
Although Sternberg (1977a, 1977b) interprets his 
data as supporting one of the models over the others, 
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several inherent aspects of his methodology may limit 
his conclusions. As Garner, Hake, and Eriksen (1956) 
indicate, findings on covert processes may depend on 
the measuring operations. The limitations of Sternberg's 
methods will be described briefly here. A more detailed 
discussion is given in the Appendix. 
First, the subtractive factor design requires some 
strong assumptions about the independence of priming 
and processing sequences. Not only must priming not 
influence subsequent processing, but the natural order 
of component event execution must correspond to the 
' stimulus order given in the primes. Unfortunately, no 
data on the validity of this assumption are available. 
Second, even given the validity of the design assump-
tions, some methodological problems may have limited 
the difference between self-terminating and exhaustive 
models of processing. Although all models reproduced 
analogy response times quite well (Models I-IV, on the 
average, accounted for 78%, 83%, 86%, and 85% of the 
variance, respectively), the difference between the 
fully exhaustive Model I and the fully self-terminating 
Model IV is relatively small. However, the power to 
discriminate between the models may have been low for 
two reasons: measurement errors in the stimulus 
information indices, and problems in applying the 
priming method to self-terminating processes. With 
respect to the information indices, for verbal analogies 
the difference between the models depended on rated, 
rather than objective, measures of stimulus attributes. 
Errors in the ratings will lead to less discrimination 
between the models. With respect to the priming 
method, solution time estimates for processes occurring 
after the prime will be biased if the primed processing 
has not been exhaustive. If the primed processes are 
self-terminating, the remaining solution time partially 
reflects these processes, as well as the later processes in 
the sequence. 
These methodological limitations indicate that 
Sternberg's results need convergent validation (Garner 
et al., 1956) by another method. The purpose of the 
current study is to test the componential theory and 
models by a method that is based on different under-
lying assumptions than subtractive factor modeling. 
Protocol analysis has been gaining popularity as a 
method for studying processing (e.g., Greeno, 1976; 
Simon, 1976). Although protocol analysis also requires 
strong assumptions, these assumptions are substantially 
different from those underlying subtractive factor 
models. One especially important difference is that 
protocol analysis does not require specifying an a priori 
sequence for the processing events. The current study 
uses protocol analysis on an analogy task to examine 
several aspects of componential theory: (1) the necessity 
of six component events (encoding, inference, mapping, 
application, justification, and preparation and response) 
to account for analogy solving, (2) the sequential nature 
of component event processes (i.e., the order of event  
execution and the exhaustiveness of the processing), 




The most direct technique for protocol analysis is for 
subjects to verbalize during problem solving. However, a pilot 
study indicated that this technique would not be successful 
for verbal analogies. Subjects often were unable to verbalize 
about the analogy solving process, and substantial eye movement 
between analogy stimuli was observed during periods of no 
verbalization. Apparently, the processing is performed too 
rapidly and automatically to be studied by introspective 
methods. 
An analogy simulation task was devised as an alternative 
technique for protocol analysis. The major assumption 
underlying the simulation task is that processing sequences may 
be inferred from subjects' patterns of information requests about 
analogy stimuli. In the simulation task, the analogy stimuli 
consist of terms for which the subjects have no prior information 
relevant to the analogy problem. Thus, the subject must request 
information from the experimenter. Although the simulation 
task differs from standard verbal analogies in stimulus meaning-
fulness, it is still a fundamental analogy that requires the 
problem solver to draw parallels between stimuli from semantic 
information. 
The stimuli in the analogy simulation task consisted of a 
multiple-choice analogy in the following structural form: 
A : B C : (Stem) 
D, D2 D 3 D4 (Alternatives) 
The simulation task stimuli corresponding to this structural 
form are seven pronounceable nonwords, as follows: 
Lyomon:Firmani::Duciver: ? (Stem) 
Bansher Ponto Nax Squish (Alternatives) 
These seven stimuli refer to animals that could evolve on other 
planets. Figure 1 shows a picture of one of the animals used in 
the task introduction and its list of properties. The pictorial 
representationi of the animals were adapted from a Smithsonian 
SQUISH 
1. Lives on a high gravity world. 
2. Does not migrate. 
3. Is an aquatic predator. 
4. Swims by jet propulsion with gills and tail. 
5. Evolutionarily an old animal. 
Figure 1. Example of a stimulus from the analogy simulation 
task. 
ir  magazine feature on structurally feasible animals that, for some 
reason, did not emerge from the evolutionary process. An artist 
specialized in natural history illustrations was hired to produce 
drawings for the seven analogy animals and two animals to be 
used in the task instructions. The properties of the animals were 
coordinated with, but could not be directly inferred from, the 
animal's morphological structure. The properties concerned such 
things as habitat, locomotion, means of subsistence, migration, 
social structure, and so on. 
As in standard analogies, only some of the information about 
the stimuli is relevant to the analogy. In the simulation task, 
the analogy is based on matching a predator-prey relationship 
between Duciver and Ponto to the predator-prey relationship 
between Lyomon and Firmani. Two associated properties 
were also relevant to this relationship: habitat and means of 
subsistence. 
The analogy simulation task is administered individually, 
and the subject is given general instructions prior to examining 
two example stimuli. To prevent excessive rehearsal and thus 
increase memory load, subjects view the property list only while 
reading aloud. The experimenter scores each request for 
information as a separate step in the analogy solving process. 
The major assumption of the task is that analogy processing 
sequences may be scored from information requests. The 
following scoring system was used: (1) Stimulus encoding is 
scored as the first information request for an analogy term; 
(2) inference and mapping are scored by sequential requests 
for A:B or A:C, respectively; (3) application is scored by 
sequential requests for C and at least two alternatives, D, 
and D 2 ; and (4) a solution search is scored when at least two 
alternatives are viewed. A process is exhaustive if only one 
request for the appropriate stimuli is given during the entire 
protocol. Otherwise, the process is self-terminating. 
In this scoring system, the attribute comparison processes, 
such as inference, mapping, and application are assumed to occur 
only during consecutive requests for information about the 
appropriate stimuli (A:B, A:C, and A:D). Although it should be 
obvious that this assumption will never be fully met, the 
potential for covert processing leads to underestimating the 
degree of self-terminating processing. That is, the scoring system 
assumes exhaustive processing during stimulus presentation, and 
perhaps incorrectly, if no further information requests are given. 
Assuring that the assumption is at least reasonable depends 
partly on minimizing memory for the stimulus attributes so that 
relationships will not be constructed except during the relevant 
stimulus presentations. Reducing attribute memory by 
preventing rehearsal during information requests partly controls 
covert processing, but the size of the attribute list is another 
important memory factor that needs consideration. 
The size of the attribute list for the final simulation task was 
determined from the results of a pilot study. The subjects were 
38 undergraduates who were randomly assigned to one of two 
list size conditions: three vs. five attributes. Three dependent 
variables were calculated from the simulation task scores, total 
number of information requests, task solution, and number of 
relationship processes inferred from consecutive information 
requests. A multivariate test revealed significant differences 
among the conditions [F(3,34) = 4.56, p < .01] . Individual 
t tests revealed that, although probability of task solution did 
not vary between groups (t = .33, p > .05), both number of 
requests and number of attribute comparisons were significantly 
greater in the five-attribute list condition (t = 2.93, p < .01, 
and t = 2.81, p < .01, respectively). Since the five-attribute 
list apparently decreases covert processing without increasing 
task difficulty, this condition was used in subsequent research 
with the simulation task. 
Subjects 
The subjects were 143 undergraduates at a large midwestem 
university. The students participated in the experiment to earn 
points in an introductory psychology course. 
Materials 
The materials consisted of the analogy simulation task as 
described above and 27 psychometric analogies from an item 
bank that had been developed for a college population 
(described in Tinsley & Dawis, 1975; Whitely, 1977a). 
Procedure 
Subjects were first administered the 27 psychometric 
analogies under standard ability test instructions. The simulation 
task was then administered and scored as described above. 
RESULTS 
Some general descriptive statistics were calculated 
from the simulation task. The number of information 
requests (mean = 14.19, SD = 5.54) was more than 
double the seven requests that would be sufficient to 
solve the analogy if all processing were exhaustive on 
initial encoding. Scoring of information requests during 
the initial encoding of stimuli revealed that 84.3% 
requested the stimuli in an order that corresponds to the 
processing event order of inference, mapping, and 
application; that is, the stem stimuli were requested in 
the order of A, B, C, followed by the alternatives. For 
7.2%, the stimulus order corresponded to the order of 
mapping, inference, and application; that is, the stem 
stimuli were requested in the order of A, C, B, followed 
by the alternatives. Of the remaining subjects, 6% 
requested one or more distractors prior to completely 
encoding the stem, while another 2.4% requested stem 
stimuli in idiosyncratic patterns (i.e., B, C, A; C, B, A). 
After initial encoding of all stimuli, 58.7% of the 
subjects repeat a solution search by requesting informa-
tion about two or more alternatives. However, only 
19.7% of the solution searches after encoding involved 
all four alternatives. Apparently, some alternatives were 
falsified as possible solutions to the analogy during 
earlier processing. Another frequent pattern that was 
not directly anticipated from the componential theory 
was the request for a single alternative, preceded by one 
or more stem elements. Since this request involves 
no direct comparison between alternatives, it was 
tentatively labeled "confirmation." At least one 
confirmation was observed for 45.5% of the subjects. 
Table 1 presents the frequencies and percentages for 
subjects using the various strategies on the simulation 
task. Strategy during encoding was scored separately 
from strategy after encoding because nearly 36% of the 
subjects requested repeated information about pairs of 
the stem elements prior to encoding the alternatives. 
Three separate patterns were observed, and a chi-square 
test revealed that the relative frequencies associated with 
these strategies were significantly different (x 2 = 42.82, 
p < .01). The most frequent request was for the A:B 
pair; the complete stem stimuli (A, B, and C) and the 
mapping pair (A:C) were requested far less frequently. 
Substantial variability was also observed for strategies 
after complete encoding. Table 1 shows that only 18.2% 
of the subjects completed the problem immediately 
after encoding. This pattern would occur if all processing 
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Table 1 




Strategy During Initial Encoding 
Total 143 100.0 
Request encoding information only 92 64.3 
Request for information comparisons 51 35.7 
Inference comparison only (A:B) 39 27.3 
Mapping comparison only (A:C) 5 3.5 
Full stem comparison (A:B::C) 7 4.9 
Strategy After Initial Encoding 
Total 143 100.0 
Immediate problem completion 26 18.2 
Confirmation followed by problem completion 33 23.1 
Distractor search before problem completion 84 58.7 
Without stem return 2 1.4 
Preceded by C request 14 9.8 
Preceded by A:C request 1 .7 
Preceded by A:B request 2 1.4 
Preceded by A:B::C request 65 45.5 
were exhaustive, as in Sternberg's (1977a, 1977b) 
Model I. However, another 23.1% of the subjects made 
only one confirmation step before problem completion. 
Table 1 also shows that for the 58.7% of the subjects 
who repeated solution searches after encoding, the most 
frequent pattern was to precede the search by requesting 
information about all stem elements. This is the pattern 
that corresponds to Sternberg's (1977a, 1977b) 
Model IV, with all self-terminating processing. The 
second most frequent pattern for a solution search was 
to follow a request for only the C stimulus. This pattern 
corresponds to Sternberg's Model II, in which only 
application is self-terminating. Solution searches preceded 
by only A:B or only A:C (the latter corresponds to 
Model III) were rarely observed. The frequency differ-
ences between the patterns that correspond to the four 
models, with confirmation included in Model I, were 
significant (x 2 = 89.00, p < .01), but no difference was 
found between Model I with confirmation and Model IV 
(x2 = .29, p > .05). Thus, the exhaustive process model 
with confirmation provides a general model that is as 
good as the fully self-terminating model in accounting 
for the observed patterns. 
Since the best single general model accounts for less 
than 50% of the cases, determining the number of 
strategy models needed to account for substantial 
numbers of cases is important. Figure 2 presents a  
summary of the cumulative percentage of cases that are 
accounted for under increasingly complex strategy 
models. It can be seen that adding the confirmation 
event to the least complex model, exhaustive processing, 
substantially increases the percentage of cases. Adding 
a model that permits self-terminating application gives 
less improvement than the addition of the confirmation 
event, but the improvement can be regarded significant, 
as the change is 2.39 times bigger than the standard 
error of the preceding percentages of cases. The next 
model adds mapping as self-terminating, and negligible 
improvement is shown. Finally, substantial improvement 
is gained by adding inference as self-terminating. These 
results show that four separate strategy models are 
needed to account for the observed patterns. 
Table 2 presents a cross-classification of strategies 
executed consecutively. The strategies scored under the 
column categories are executed following the strategies 
scored under the row categories. The low-frequency 
categories of solution searches preceded only by 
mapping or inference were eliminated in this analysis. 
The 143 subjects executed a total of 219 strategy moves, 
giving a mean of 1.53. Significant association of the 
strategy types over times was indicated by a significant 
relationship among the cross-classified categories 
(x2 = 15.46, p < .05). The main contributors to the 
relationship are of the relative dependencies among 
confirmation followed by problem completion, and 
application followed by confirmation. 
Strategies were also related to finding the correct 
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Figure 2. Percentage of cases accounted for by increasingly 
complex models. 
Table 2 
Probabilities and Frequencies of Strategy Sequences Over Time 
Time t + I 
Problem 	 Inference, Mapping, 
Completion Confirmation 	Application 	and Application 	Total 
Time t N P N P N P N P N P 
Confirmation 62 .601 22 .214 4 .039 15 .146 103 .470 
Application 9 .375 13 .542 0 .000 2 .083 24 .110 
Inference, Mapping, and Application 43 .467 20 .217 7 .071 22 .239 92 .420 
Total 114 .521 55 .251 11 .050 39 .178 219 
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analysis of variance with four groups revealed that 
strategy during encoding, using the four categories in 
Table 1, is significantly related to solving the task 
(F = 3.72, p < .01). The probabilities associated with 
analogy solving for the four strategy groups are as 
follows: encoding information only, .56; repeated 
inference stimuli, .75; repeated full stem stimuli, .63; 
repeated mapping stimuli, .17. Thus, obtaining addi-
tional inference information or the full stem information 
was associated with higher probabilities of problem 
solving, while obtaining mapping information was 
associated with a lower probability of problem solving. 
The most complex strategy a subject executed 
after encoding was also related to solving the analogy. 
A one-factor analysis of variance indicated no signifi-
cant differences in probabilities of solving the task 
[F(3,139) = 1.05, p > .05] . The following probabilities 
of task solution were observed for four strategy 
categories: immediate problem completion, .50; 
confirmation followed by problem completion, .51; 
repeated application, .63; and repeated information on 
the stem, .66. 
The similarity of the simulation task to the ability 
test analogies was examined by comparing task out-
comes. Task difficulties were quite comparable: Analogy 
solving probabilities of .53 and .52, respectively, were 
obtained for the simulation task and the average ability 
test item. However, less comparability was observed for 
the correlation of response accuracy with total score on 
the analogy test items. Although solving the simulation 
task was significantly correlated with total score (r = .20, 
p < .05), it was not as discriminating as the psycho-
metric analogies. The mean item/total score correlation 
in the analogy test was .42 (SD = .16). If the simulation 
task item/total score correlation is located on this 
distribution, it is —1.5 standard score remits below the 
mean. Thus, the simulation task is comparable to a weak 
item in the analogy test. 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of the current study was to test the 
componential theory by a converging operation. In this 
study, processing events were measured from a special 
analogy simulation task, using stimuli for which subjects 
had no prior information. The underlying assumption 
of the method is that processing events may be inferred 
from information-request patterns. Although the 
analogy simulation task differs from standard verbal 
analogies in stimulus meaningfulness, it nevertheless 
constitutes a fundamental analogy that requires the 
problem solver to draw parallels between stimuli from 
semantic information. The results from the simulation 
task will be discussed with respect to the following 
general issues in analogical reasoning: (1) the necessary 
components of analogical problem solving, (2) the 
sequential nature of componential processes, and (3) the 
extent of individual differences in processing strategies. 
Then, possible generalization to ability test analogies will 
be discussed. 
Necessary Components for Analogy Solving 
A major issue for analogical reasoning is the sufficiency 
and necessity of six component events to describe 
information processing in analogy solving. Sufficiency 
is difficult to assess from previous research using a 
subtractive factor approach because any unanticipated 
event will not be represented by either a unique prime 
or an information change measure. Several findings from 
the analogy simulation task are relevant to component 
sufficiency. 
First, although the scoring categories constructed on 
the basis of six components were generally adequate to 
describe the protocols, one pattern that occurred in 
nearly half the protocols was not directly anticipated 
by the theory. This pattern, named confirmation, 
was a request for a single alternative, preceded by 
information relevant to inference, mapping, and 
application. Confirmation was most often a terminal 
event, as the data on strategy sequences indicated that 
the pattern was most frequently followed by problem 
completion. Although this could be considered a subset 
of Sternberg's (1977b) justification component, it may 
be preferable to consider this as a separate event. 
Justification was postulated as an optional component 
to test the validity of the preceding operations. Justifi-
cation, however, is a complex event, because it can 
involve either testing a single response alternative for 
validity or discriminating between two or more options 
that are preceived to have equal validity. These two 
possibilities would seem to define rather different 
processing demands. Given the high frequency of 
the single-option pattern observed here, it may be 
meaningful to separate confirmation from the other 
types of justification. 
Second, two separate findings, partial solution 
searches and self-terminating processing prior to 
encoding the alternatives, cannot be explained by 
Sternberg's (1977a, 1977b) single-stage application 
event. Although nearly all solution searches are preceded 
by requests for repeated information on inference, 
mapping, and application, only about 20% of the 
searches involve all four alternatives. Apparently, some 
alternatives are falsified before sufficient relational 
specificity is obtained to distinguish a unique solution. 
Thus, at least some relational information that was 
previously obtained was considered valid, rather than 
rejected when a unique solution was not found among 
the alternatives. The partial solution searches are 
consistent with a two-stage application event, image 
construction and response evaluation, to account for 
the apparent validity of some initial relational informa-
tion. The repeated requests for relational information 
may be an attempt to obtain greater specificity of the 
image. 
Similarly, self-terminating processing prior to 
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encoding the alternatives supports an image construc-
tion phase that is separate from response evaluation. 
Nearly one-third of the subjects requested additional 
relational information prior to viewing the alternatives. 
Furthermore, subjects making this request had a higher 
likelihood of solving the analogy. Although this pattern 
could be an artifact of the task design, especially the 
memory load requirement, it is more likely that repeated 
processing of the stimuli continued until the solution 
image reached some critical level of specificity, as these 
pattern differences were significantly related to solving 
the task. 
Thus, the current study gives empirical support for 
application as a two-stage event on verbal analogies. 
On the surface, these findings conflict with Sternberg's 
(1977b) support for a single-stage application event. 
However, Sternberg may not have found support for the 
two-stage application event for two reasons. First, 
partial solution choices could not be observed because 
his multiple-choice analogies had only two response 
alternatives. In two-alternative analogies, partial solution 
searches are not possible, since eliminating one alterna-
tive implies accepting the other as the solution. Thus, 
partial solution searches are a new finding in the current 
study, using an analogy with four response alternatives. 
Second, Sternberg's (1977b, p. 193) more direct test 
for the two-stage application event, adding a second 
application parameter to the response time models, 
was conducted on only one type of analogy. These were 
very easy pictorial analogies, presented as a true-false 
task with a single response alternative. The failure to 
separate image construction from response evaluation 
may have resulted from the more unconscious processing 
that seems to be more involved on easy items than on 
difficult items (Sternberg & Rifkin, in press). 
A two-stage application event can be supported on 
more general theoretical grounds. First, other models 
of analogical reasoning have postulated the construction 
of an image of the solution prior to response evalua-
tion (e.g., Rumelhart & Abrahamson, 1973). Second, 
image construction is also consistent with a means-end 
analysis to problem solving (Newell & Simon, 1972). 
A means strategy seeks to solve problems by reducing 
the difference between the current state and the goal 
state (problem solution). But, in order to evaluate 
between possible moves, the problem solver must have 
a procedure for deciding which strategy will transform 
the current state into the closest approximation of the 
goal state. For analogy problems, an image of the 
solution can facilitate the application component in 
two ways. First, the solver can begin to specify the 
attributes the solution must have and falsify some 
alternatives, thus reducing the size of working memory. 
Second, the best alternative can be determined by 
comparison to the image of the solution. Thus, the 
separation of image construction from response 
evaluation is consistent with other theories that have 
some empirical support. 
Sequential Nature of Component Processes 
The findings from the analogy simulation task are 
relevant to two issues about processing sequences: 
(1) the order of processing events during initial 
encoding, and (2) the mode of event execution, self-
terminating vs. exhaustive processing. With respect to 
the first issue, the results from the current study give 
empirical support for the processing event order that was 
assumed in previous studies. Nearly 85% of the subjects 
request stimulus information in patterns that correspond 
to the event order of inference, mapping, and applica-
tion. For a rather small percentage of subjects (7.2%), 
mapping preceded inference, while 6% of the subjects 
viewed a solution alternative prior to encoding the 
complete stem information, possibly as an attempt to 
direct the inference and mapping operations. Thus, 
although the general trend of inference followed by 
mapping and application is quite strong, some weak 
individual differences are also indicated. 
With respect to the mode of event execution, the 
results support self-terminating events as a needed 
addition to models of processing on verbal analogies. 
Although the simulation task underestimates self-
terminating operations because covert processing is not 
completely controlled, nearly 60% of the subjects 
overtly engaged in some self-terminating operations, as 
indicated by repeated information on the relational 
stimuli. Thus, self-terminating processing for at least 
some events are supported by convergent operations: 
previous work using the priming method, and the 
current protocol analysis. 
Somewhat in conflict with previous work, however, 
are the number of self-terminating events needed to 
account for the data. Previous work indicated support 
for mapping and application as self-terminating, but 
found inconsistent results for inference. The protocol 
analysis indicates that all relational events—inference, 
mapping, and application—are self-terminating, since a 
pattern of repeated requests for all stem information was 
by far the most frequent pattern for nonexhaustive 
processing. 
The current study also confirms Sternberg's (1977a, 
p. 238) finding for verbal analogies that no single-strategy 
model was consistently better at the individual subject 
level. The single best model, fully self-terminating 
processing, accounted for only about 45% of the subjects. 
These findings, however, in conjunction with the previous 
data, strongly argue against postulating a single general 
strategy model for verbal analogies. Although the best 
strategy model is fully self-terminating processing, the 
exhaustive model, with confirmation, accounts for 
4L3% of the subjects. The next section elaborates on 
the theoretical implications of rejecting a general 
strategy model. 
Individual Differences in Processing Strategies 
The current findings suggest that strategy models 
may be an important source of individual differences in 
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processing on verbal analogies. Four separate processing 
models were needed to account for the data. Many 
subjects' protocols were adequately described by the 
exhaustive processing model; others engaged in self-
terminating processing on one or more events. 
Additionally, individual variability in processing 
sequences was also observed prior to complete informa-
tion encoding. Although the findings give only weak 
indications of individual differences in the initial order 
of processing events, substantial variability was found in 
the amount of repeated processing prior to the initial 
encoding of the solution alternatives. Furthermore, 
these strategy differences were associated with varying 
likelihoods of solving the analogies. 
These results suggest that a higher level of processing 
than the component events or a general strategy model 
are needed to explain the varying strategies used by 
individuals. That is, variables corresponding to control 
strategies in general information processing models 
should be part of an adequate theory of analogical 
reasoning. An associated issue that needs further 
research is the extent to which the strategy variability 
may be attributed to reliable differences between 
subjects vs. more situational factors. 
An important issue for individual differences research 
is the possible generalization of these results to the 
analogies that are found on popular ability tests. Two 
aspects of the current study may limit generalization 
to psychometric analogies. First, the measurement of 
processing sequences from the simulation task may have 
resulted in more conscious processing than is performed 
on standard analogies. Some recent evidence (Sternberg 
& Rifkin, in press) suggests that conscious processing 
may change the algorithm for solving analogies. Second, 
the simulation task represents only one of eight types of 
analogies that have been identified on ability tests 
(Whitely, 1977b). Since these types depend on some-
what different cognitive abilities (Whitely, 1976), the 
simulation task may not fully represent the processing 
performed on ability test analogies. 
Given these differences, at least some support for 
generalization to psychometric analogies can be given. 
The current study found that the simulation task 
difficulty was comparable to a psychometric analogy 
and that it had a significant, but low, correlation with 
ability test scores. A more recent study (Whitely & 
Curtright, Note 1) found that the simulation task was 
correlated as highly with ability test scores as an average 
psychometric analogy. 
In summary, although the results from the current 
study are based on a methodological operation that 
shares few common features with other studies on 
analogical reasoning, many of the findings about 
information processing on verbal analogies converge. 
Six component events were generally adequate to 
describe processing patterns, the inclusion of self-
terminating modes of processing was supported, and  
substantial variability at the individual level was 
replicated. Furthermore, one major assumption of 
previous studies, that the order of component event 
execution is inference, mapping, and application, was 
given empirical support. However, in contrast to 
previous research, the current study indicates that the 
application event should be separated into two com-
ponents, image construction and response evaluation, 
and that a new component event, confirmation, should 
be added. Furthermore, the results suggested that 
the extent of variability in strategy models was so 
substantial that a higher level processing operation, such 
as control strategies, should be postulated, rather than 
support a single-strategy model as characterizing analogy 
processing. 
REFERENCE NOTE 
1. Whitely, S. E., & Curtright, C. The role of problem repre-
sentation in solving verbal analogies. Unpublished manuscript, 
University of Kansas, 1979. 
REFERENCES 
GARNER, W. R., HAKE, H. W., & ERIKSEN, C. W. Operation-
alism and the concept of perception. Psychological Review, 
1956, 63, 149-159. 
GREENO, J. G. Indefinite goals in well-structured problems. Psy-
chological Review, 1976, 83, 479-491. 
NEWELL, A., & SIMoN, H. Human problem solving. Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1972. 
RE ITMAN, W. Cognition and thought. New York: Wiley, 1965. 
RUMELHART, P. E., & ABRAHAMSON, A. A. A model for ana- 
logical reasoning. Cognitive Psychology, 1973, 5, 1-28. 
SIMON, H. A. Identifying basic abilities underlying intelligent 
performance of complex tasks. In L. B. Resnick, (Ed.), The 
nature of intelligence. New York: Halsted Press, 1976. 
SPEARMAN, C. The abilities of man. New York: Macmillan, 1927. 
STERNBERG, R. J. Component processes in analogical reasoning. 
Psychological Review, 1977, 31, 356-378. (a) 
STERNBERG, R. J. Intelligence, information-processing and ana-
logical reasoning: The componential analysis of human abilities. 
Hillsdale, N.J: Erlbaum, 1977. (b) 
STERNBERG, R. J., & RIFKIN, B. The development of analogical 
reasoning processes. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 
in press. 
TINSLEY, H. E. A., & DAWIS, R. V. An investigation of the 
Rasch simple logistic model. Sample free item and test calibra-
tion. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 1975, 35, 
325-340. 
WHITELY, S. E. Solving verbal analogies: Some cognitive compo-
nents of intelligence test items. Journal of Educational Psychol-
ogy, 1976, 68, 234-242. 
WHITELY, S. E. Information-processing on intelligence test items. 
Some response components. Applied Psychological Measure-
ment, 1977, 1, 465-476. (a) 
WHITELY, S. E. Relationships in analogies: A semantic compo-
nent of psychometric task. Educational and Psychological 
Measurement, 1977, 37, 725-739. (b) 
APPENDIX 
Componential Theory of Analogical Reasoning 
This section is presented for the reader who wants greater 
detail on the componential theory and the modeling methods. 
Sternberg (1977a, 1977b) postulates six processes for 
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analogy solving. Figure A presents a schematic of these 
processes, for an analogy of the form A:B::C:D, such as in the 
following example: 
Washington:1::Lincoln: ? 
(1) 10 (2) 5 (Answer = 5) 
Encoding is the process by which the subject converts the 
physical stimulus term into an internal representation in working 
memory. In part, the internal representation consists of a list 
of attributes and properties of the stimulus that is activated 
from long-term memory during encoding. Inference involves a 
comparison between Stimuli A and B to discover the relationship 
between them. Mapping consists of discovering the rule between 
A and C, and application generates the rule to find the ideal 
solution, D, and evaluate D, and D 2 for correspondence to D. 
The preparation and response components are control strategies 
for preparing to solve the analogy and translating the solution 
into a response. These are actually two processes, but Sternberg 
(1977a, 1977b) generally combines them in his models. 
Justification (not shown in Figure A) is a process that occurs 
when a unique answer is not given by the sequence of events 
described above (i.e., D, and D 2 appear equally correct). In this 
stage, the relationships and encoding may be checked so that one 
answer can be justified as correct. Actually, as Sternberg 
describes justification, the process refers to several processing 
events that can possibly occur following failure to find an 
alternative that corresponds to the "ideal" answer. 
In the analogy example given above, inference involves 
discovering that Washington's portrait is on a $1 bill, whereas 
mapping involves discovering that both Washington and Lincoln 
are presidents with portraits on money. Application consists of 
specifying that Lincoln's portrait is on a $5 bill and evaluating 
10 and 5 as possible answers. The response phase gives 5 as the 
solution to the analogy. 
In addition to the six processing events, two strategies for 
scanning the alternatives are given by Sternberg (1977a, 1977b). 
Alternating option scanning, a single attribute of the ideal 
answer D, is compared to all alternatives (i.e., D, and D 2 ) before 
checking a second attribute, and so on. In contrast, sequential 
option scanning involves checking all attributes of D against 
D, before evaluating D 2 , and so on. For both strategies, the 
subject attempts to falsify alternatives so that an unfalsified 
alternative can be given as the correct answer. 
Sternberg (1977a, 1977b) gives flowcharts for four strategy 
models for the basic processing events. Three of the events-
inference, mapping, and application-vary in the models. In 
Model I, the events are executed sequentially and all processing 
is exhaustive. In Model II, inference and mapping are exhaustive, 
but application is self-terminating. That is, application consists 
of only as many attribute relationships as are needed to give a 
unique answer. In contrast, exhaustive application consists of 
checking all attribute relationships. In Model III, inference is 
exhaustive, while mapping and application are self-terminating. 
In Model IV, inference, mapping, and application are all self-
terminating. Sternberg (1977a) shows how the four models may 
be combined with the two alternative scanning strategies to yield 
eight possible models for forced-choice analogies. 
Supporting Data and Methods 
Table A presents the mathematical models corresponding to 
the four strategy models. For simplicity, the models presented 
here are for true-false analogies. Forced-choice analogy models 
are merely elaborations on the basic model for true-false 
analogies, as they specify how the alternatives are scanned. For 
each model, equations are given for the analogy solution time, 
under four priming conditions. When no priming occurs, all 
processing must occur during the presentation of the full 
analogy. As the cues presented during priming increase, the 
processing events occurring during the full analogy presentation 
are assumed to decrease. Also shown in Table A are information 
measures, f, g, and h, that are used in the models. These 
measures are scored from the information changes between 
analogy terms to indicate the number of times a given processing 
event occurs for a given analogy item. 
In Modell, under zero cues, no priming precedes the 
presentation of the full analogy, while for one cue, the A term is 
presented prior to the full analogy. The solution time difference 
(ST, - ) between zero and one cue is the encoding of the A 
term, and this is represented by one less encoding Parameter a 
in the model for one cue. In the two-cue prime, both A and B 
are presented. Here, it is assumed that two terms are encoded, 
and the A:B relationship is inferred during the prime. Thus, the 
solution time for two cues does not include these parameters. 
Under the three-cue prime, A, B, and C are presented, and it is 
assumed that encoding of three terms, inference, and mapping 
all occur during the prime. The remaining processing, encoding 
of one term and application, occurs during the full analogy 
presentation. 
The assumptions underlying priming for inferences about 
processing events and the estimation of processing durations 
can now be examined more critically. First, if the processing 
events do not occur in the specified order (e.g., inference, 
mapping, and application), the parameter estimates will not 
reflect the duration of these processes in unprimed analogies. 
Second, the processing estimates will not be representative of 
what occurs on unprimed analogies if priming itself changes 
subsequent processing. 
Also presented in Table A are mathematical models for the 
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Basic Equations for the Models of Analogical Reasoning 
Cues Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
0 ST2 = 4a + fx + gy + fz + c STo = 4a + fx + gy + f'z' + c ST2 = 4a + fx + g'y' + f'z' + c ST0 = 4a + f'x' + g'y' + f'z' + 
1 ST, = 3a+ fx+gy+ fz+ c ST, = 3a + fx + gy + 	z' + c ST, = 3a + fx + g'y' + fz' + c ST, = 3a + f'x' + g'y' + f'z' + c 
2 ST2 = 2a + 	+ gy + fz + c ST2 = 2a + 	+ gy + f'z' + c ST2 = 2a + 	+ g'y' + fz' + c ST2 = 2a + 	+ g'y' + f'z' + c 
3 ST3 = 	a + + 	+ fz + c ST 3 = 	a+ + 	+ f'z' + c ST 3 = 	a+ + 	+ f'z' + c ST 3 = 	a+ + 	+fz'+c  
Note-ST; = solution time i; a = exhaustive figure scanning and encoding time; x = exhaustive inference time; y = exhaustive mapping 
time; z = exhaustive application time; x' = self-terminating inference time; y' = self-terminating mapping time; z' = self-terminating 
application time; c = constant preparation and response time; N = total number of features; T = truth index (0 = true, 1 = false); 
f = number of features changed from .4 to B; g = number of features changed from A to C; h = number of D features correctly 
matched to D'; f = 1(N + T)I(N - h + 1)1 X ( f )I(N); g' = [(N + T)AN - h + 1)1 X (g)I(N)• 
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self-terminating strategies. Under Model III, for example, 
mapping and application are both self-terminating. That is, they 
are performed only until a unique solution is found for the 
problem. For this model, the difference between the two-cue 
and three-cue solution times is the self-terminating mapping 
time, which is assumed to occur during the prime. However, 
this assumption seems unwarranted, as the subject cannot know 
prior to viewing the alternatives how many attributes need to 
be tested. Thus, if mapping is self-terminating, only one attribute 
relationship will be mapped during the prime, with the needed 
additional mapping occurring during the full analogy. In this 
case, the other parameters for the three-cue solution time are 
overestimated. The situation becomes even more critical for 
Model IV, as both self-terminating inference and mapping are 
assumed to occur during the prime. Thus, it is clear that priming 
can lead to biased estimates of self-terminating process durations 
in these models. 
Another important feature of the mathematical models 
is the estimation of information changes. It can be seen in 
Table A that the only differences between the self-terminating 
and the exhaustive mathematical models are the estimates 
of information changes for each analogy. Specifically, the  
different estimates depend on the information difference 
between the specified alternatives, D's, and the ideal answer, D. 
Although Sternberg (1977a, 1977b) was able to obtain an 
objective index of information changes for figural analogies, only 
subjective ratings of relational distance were available for verbal 
and geometric analogies. Thus, the difference in validity between 
self-terminating and exhaustive models is dependent on . the 
validity of the ratings. 
Measuring information change is especially critical for forced-
choice analogies, since the difference between the two models 
for scanning the alternatives, as well as the estimation of the 
justification process parameter, depends on the information 
change measure. The only forced-choice data given by Sternberg 
(1977a) are the geometric analogies, and rated measures of 
information change are used. Thus, any inadequacies in the 
ratings are directly reflected in the test between the two alterna-
tive scanning models and the estimation of the justification 
parameter. 
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